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WHEN IS WHENEVER? EPA’S 
RETROACTIVE WITHDRAWAL 
AUTHORITY IN MINGO LOGAN 
HALE MELNICK* 
Abstract: In 2007, the United States Army Corps of Engineers granted Mingo 
Logan Coal Co. a permit to discharge dredge and fill material into four West 
Virginia streams and their tributaries. The U.S. Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA) did not file an objection despite concerns about the discharge’s 
environmental impacts. Two years later, EPA moved to withdraw the permit in 
light of new information and circumstances regarding the discharge’s impact 
on wildlife. EPA claimed that it was authorized to withdraw the permit under 
Section 404(c) of the Clean Water Act, which provides the Administrator of 
EPA with the authority to veto specification sites “whenever he determines” a 
discharge will have an “unacceptable adverse effect” on identified environ-
mental resources. Mingo Logan appealed EPA’s permit withdrawal on the 
grounds that EPA exceeded its authority under the Clean Water Act. The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia upheld EPA’s authority to retro-
actively withdraw the permit. Although the court’s decision has sweeping im-
plications for the reach of EPA, this Comment argues that such broad adminis-
trative authority is justified by the plain text of the Clean Water Act and the 
need for the federal government to take immediate action during environmen-
tal crises. 
INTRODUCTION 
Mingo Logan Coal Co. (“Mingo Logan”) was incorporated in 1981 
and is based in Wharncliffe, West Virginia.1 In 2007, Mingo Logan acquired 
a mountaintop coal mine in West Virginia from Hobet Mining, Inc., a fellow 
subsidiary corporation of Arch Coal, Inc., after Hobet Mining experienced 
opposition to its operations.2 Mountaintop mining involves removing the 
top of a mountain to extract coal, which produces excess rock, topsoil, and 
                                                                                                                           
 *Staff Writer, BOSTON COLLEGE ENVIRONMENTAL AFFAIRS LAW REVIEW, 2015–2016. 
 1 Company Overview of Mingo Logan Coal Company, BLOOMBERG BUS., http://www.
bloomberg.com/research/stocks/private/snapshot.asp?privcapId=90039810 [http://perma.cc/4EE6-
FD9D]. 
 2 Spruce 1 Mine, SOURCEWATCH, http://www.sourcewatch.org/index.php/Spruce_1_Mine 
[http://perma.cc/SB72-VQFM]. 
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debris (“spoil”) that “cannot be returned to the mined area.”3 In 1998, 
Hobet Mining began applying for the necessary permits to discharge those 
materials, including an application for a permit under Section 404(a) of the 
Clean Water Act (CWA).4 That permit, which was eventually granted to 
Mingo Logan in 2007 despite concerns from the U.S. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA), authorized Mingo Logan to discharge dredged or fill 
material into stream segments, including the Pigeonroost and Oldhouse 
Branches.5 
In 2009, the Administrator of EPA (the “Administrator”) moved to 
withdraw the Section 404(a) permit—only two years after the U.S. Army 
Corps of Engineers (the “Corps”) granted it to Mingo Logan.6 EPA took this 
action based on “new information and circumstances . . . which justif[ied] 
reconsideration of the permit,” particularly its “concern[] about the project’s 
potential to degrade downstream water quality.”7 EPA claimed that it was 
authorized to take this action under Section 404(c) of the CWA, which gives 
the Administrator veto authority for specification of a site “whenever he 
determines” the discharge will have an “unacceptable adverse effect” on 
identified environmental resources.8 No provisions in the CWA or other 
statute expressly grant EPA the power to revoke permits retroactively; it 
only allows them to revoke the specified disposal site areas.9 Mingo Logan 
filed suit alleging that EPA lacked the authority to revoke its permit after the 
permit was granted, and even if EPA did have authority to do so, its deci-
sion was arbitrary and capricious and therefore invalid.10 The U.S. Court of 
Appeals for the District of Columbia’s decision in the resulting case, Mingo 
Logan Coal Co. v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, has sweeping im-
plications for the expanding reach of EPA, but such broad administrative 
                                                                                                                           
 3 Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (Mingo Logan I), 850 F. Supp. 2d 133, 
134 (D.D.C. 2012). 
 4 Spruce 1 Mine, supra note 2. 
 5 Mingo Logan I, 850 F. Supp. 2d at 136–37. Dredge is material that is excavated from a 
water source. U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, EVALUATION OF DREDGED MATERIAL PROPOSED FOR 
DISCHARGE IN WATERS OF THE U.S.—TESTING MANUAL, at xiv–xv (1998), http://www.epa.
gov/sites/production/files/2015-08/documents/inland_testing_manual_0.pdf [https://perma.cc/5J24-
NPZS]. Fill material means “any material used for the primary purpose of replacing an aquatic 
area with dry land or changing the bottom elevation of a water body for any purpose.” Id. 
 6 See Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (Mingo Logan II), 714 F.3d 608, 
610–11 (D.C. Cir. 2013); Mingo Logan I, 850 F. Supp. 2d. at 136. 
 7 Mingo Logan II, 714 F.3d at 610–11 (quoting Letter from William C. Early, Reg’l Adm’r, 
Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Colonel Robert Peterson, Dist. Eng’r, U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (Sept. 3, 
2009) (available in Joint Appendix on case docket)). 
 8 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (2012) (emphasis added). 
 9 See Mingo Logan I, 850 F. Supp. 2d at 140. 
 10 See Mingo Logan II, 714 F.3d at 609. 
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authority is justified by the text of the law and the need for the federal gov-
ernment to take immediate action during environmental crises.11 
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY 
 In June 1999, Mingo Logan’s predecessor applied for a permit to dis-
charge material “into four West Virginia streams and their tributaries.”12 
Section 404 of the CWA gives the Secretary of the Army (the “Secretary”), 
acting through the Corps, authority to grant permits to discharge dredged or 
fill material.13 After the Corps prepared a draft Environmental Impact 
Statement in 2002 that assessed the comprehensive effect of the mining op-
eration, the EPA expressed concern that even the best mountaintop mining 
practices yield “significant and unavoidable environmental impacts” that 
the Corps did not adequately address.14 EPA, however, did not pursue a 
Section 404(c) objection at the time.15 That Section authorizes the Adminis-
trator, after consultation with the Corps, to veto the Corps’ disposal site 
specification “whenever he determines” that the discharge will have an “un-
acceptable adverse effect on identified environmental resources.”16 
The Corps issued a Section 404 permit to Mingo Logan, effective from 
January 22, 2007 through December 31, 2031.17 The permit expressly ad-
vised that the Corps could reevaluate its decision at any time, and that it 
could subsequently suspend, modify, or revoke the permit.18 The permit, 
however, made no mention of any future action allowed by EPA.19 
                                                                                                                           
 11 See infra notes 92–106 and accompanying text (noting that while EPA’s authority to essen-
tially revoke permits might have negative implications such as a chilling effect in industry, the 
need for EPA’s expertise to protect our environment outweighs those negative implications). 
 12 Mingo Logan II, 714 F.3d at 610. Mingo Logan initially applied for a permit to discharge 
material into the Right Fork of the Seng Camp Creek, Pigeonroost Branch, Oldhouse Branch, and 
White Oak Branch. Mingo Logan I, 850 F. Supp. 2d at 135. 
 13 Mingo Logan II, 714 F.3d at 610 n.1. 
 14 Id. at 610 (quoting Letter from Donald S. Welsh, Reg’l Adm’r, Envtl. Prot. Agency, to 
Ginger Mullins, Chief, U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (June 16, 2006) (available in Joint Appendix 
on case docket)). An Environmental Impact Statement is a document that EPA “requires a federal 
agency to produce before undertaking a major project or legislative proposal so that better deci-
sions can be made about the positive and negative environmental effects of an undertaking.” Envi-
ronmental-Impact Statement, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). 
 15 Mingo Logan II, 714 F.3d at 610 (quoting Email from William Hoffman, Envtl. Prot. 
Agency, to Teresa Spagna, U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (Nov. 2, 2006, 03:17 PM) (available in 
Joint Appendix on case docket)) (“[W]e have no intention of taking our Spruce Mine concerns any 
further from a Section 404 standpoint . . . .”). 
 16 Id.; see also 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (2012) (describing procedure for withdrawal of specifica-
tion site). 
 17 Mingo Logan II, 714 F.3d at 610. 
 18 Id. 
 19 Id. 
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On September 3, 2009, EPA requested that the Corps “use its discre-
tionary authority . . . to suspend, revoke or modify” Mingo Logan’s permit 
to discharge dredged and/or fill material, citing “new information and cir-
cumstances . . . which justif[ied] reconsideration of the permit.”20 EPA was 
particularly concerned “about the project’s potential to degrade downstream 
water quality.”21 Despite the Corp’s dismissal of the request, EPA stated that 
it intended to use its veto power under Section 404(c) of the CWA and regu-
lations in Part 213 of Title 40 of the Code of Federal Regulations.22 EPA 
proceeded to issue a public notice of a “Proposed Determination” on April 
2, 2010, to withdraw or restrict the use of certain rivers and tributaries for 
the discharge of dredged and/or fill material from the project site.23 EPA 
then issued a “Recommended Determination” on September 24, 2010, to 
withdraw two rivers and their tributaries from the specification.24 On Janu-
ary 13, 2011, EPA adopted the Recommended Determination as its “Final 
Determination.”25 
Mingo Logan filed a claim in the U.S. District Court for the District of 
Columbia challenging EPA’s authority to revoke the three-year-old permit 
and asserting that the Final Determination was ultra vires and arbitrary and 
capricious.26 The district court granted judgment to Mingo Logan on cross-
                                                                                                                           
 20 Id. at 610–11 (quoting Letter from William C. Early to Colonel Robert Peterson, supra note 
7). 
 21 Id. at 611 (quoting Letter from William C. Early to Colonel Robert Peterson, supra note 7). 
 22 Id. (citing Letter from William C. Early, Reg’l Adm’r, Envtl. Prot. Agency, to Colonel 
Robert Peterson, Dist. Eng’r, U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs (Oct.16, 2009) (available in Joint Ap-
pendix on case docket)). 40 C.F.R. § 231 states that “the procedures to be followed by the Environ-
mental Protection agency in prohibiting or withdrawing the specification, or denying, restricting, or 
withdrawing the use for specification, of any defined area as a disposal site for dredged or fill materi-
al pursuant to section 404(c) of the Clean Water Act . . . .” 40 C.F.R. § 231.1 (2015). 
 23 Mingo Logan II, 714 F.3d at 610–11. 
 24 Id. at 611. A recommended determination is a document prepared by EPA’s Regional Ad-
ministrator or his designee that demonstrates EPA’s intention to restrict or prohibit a site based on 
unacceptable adverse effects that are likely to occur. Spruce No. 1 Mine 404(c) Frequent Ques-
tions, U.S. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, http://www3.epa.gov/region03/mtntop/spruce1qa.html [http://
perma.cc/PC9H-P989]. Prior to issuing a recommended determination, the EPA Regional Admin-
istrator must issue a proposed recommendation notifying the public that it is considering restrict-
ing or prohibiting a site, and it must allow for public comments on the subject. Id. 
 25 Mingo Logan II, 714 F.3d at 611. A final determination “represents the last step of EPA’s 
Section 404(c) process,” and involves “affirming, modifying, or rescinding the recommended 
determination.” Spruce No. 1 Mine 404(c) Frequent Questions, supra note 24. 
 26 Mingo Logan II, 714 F.3d at 611. Black’s Law Dictionary defines “ultra vires” as 
“[u]nauthorized; beyond the scope of power allowed or granted by . . . law.” Ultra Vires, BLACK’S 
LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014). An “arbitrary and capricious” challenge is brought under the 
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA” or the “Act”). 5 U.S.C. § 706(2)(A) (2012). The Act pre-
scribes the procedures for federal agency action. Id. § 706. Section 706(2)(A) of the APA states: 
“The reviewing court shall hold unlawful and set aside agency action, findings, and conclusions 
found to be arbitrary and capricious.” Id. §706(2)(A). An agency taking action without providing 
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motions for summary judgment.27 The court held that EPA “exceeded its 
authority under section 404(c) of the CWA when it attempted to invalidate 
an existing permit by withdrawing the specification of certain areas as dis-
posal sites after a permit had been issued by the Corps under section 
404(a).”28 EPA appealed, and the Corps joined EPA’s brief.29 The U.S. 
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit reversed, holding that 
EPA did possess post-permit withdrawal authority, and remanded the case 
for consideration of Mingo Logan’s remaining challenges.30 On remand, the 
district court denied Mingo Logan’s remaining motions for summary judg-
ment.31 
II. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
The Clean Water Act (CWA) “establishes the basic structure for regu-
lating discharges of pollutants into the waters of the United States and regu-
lating quality standards for surface waters.”32 The U.S. Environmental Pro-
tection Agency (EPA) is the agency delegated to administer the CWA.33 
Under the CWA, EPA has implemented various pollution control programs, 
such as setting wastewater standards for industries and water quality stand-
ards for all contaminants in surface waters.34 CWA prohibits the discharge 
of any pollutant from a point source into navigable waters without a per-
mit.35 Industrial and municipal facilities must also obtain permits if they 
discharge pollutants directly into surface waters.36 
                                                                                                                           
sufficient reasoning for taking that action constitutes arbitrary and capricious action pursuant to 
the APA. See id.; Citizens to Preserve Overton Park, Inc. v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 416 (1971). 
 27 Mingo Logan I, 850 F. Supp. 2d 133, 134 (D.D.C. 2012). 
 28 Id.; see 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a), (c) (2012). 
 29 Mingo Logan II, 714 F.3d at 611. 
 30 Id. at 609; Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. U.S. Envtl. Prot. Agency (Mingo Logan III), 70 F. 
Supp. 3d 151, 154 (D.D.C. 2014). 
 31 Mingo Logan III, 70 F. Supp. 3d at 154–55. 
 32 Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251–1387; Summary of the Clean Water Act, U.S. ENVTL. 
PROT. AGENCY, http://www2.epa.gov/laws-regulations/summary-clean-water-act [http://perma.cc/
A9RN-UP2Y]. 
 33 33 U.S.C. § 1251(d). 
 34 Id. §§ 1251–1274; see Summary of the Clean Water Act, supra note 32. 
 35 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a) (“Except as in compliance with [CWA] the discharge of any pollutant 
by any person shall be unlawful.”); see Summary of the Clean Water Act, supra note 32. The regu-
lations define “point source” as: 
[A]ny discernible, confined, and discrete conveyance, including but not limited to, any 
pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, conduit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, 
concentrated animal feeding operation, landfill leachate collection system, vessel or 
other floating craft from which pollutants are or may be discharged. 
40 C.F.R. § 122.2 (2015). 
 36 See Summary of the Clean Water Act, supra note 32. 
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The CWA provides that the discharging of pollutants is unlawful ex-
cept as in compliance with specifically enumerated CWA provisions, in-
cluding Section 404.37 Under Section 404(a) of the CWA, the Secretary of 
the Corps (the “Secretary”) is authorized to issue permits allowing permit-
tees to discharge dredged or fill material “at specified material sites.”38 Un-
der Section 404(b), the sites are specified by the Secretary using guidelines 
developed by the Administrator of EPA (the “Administrator”) and the Secre-
tary.39 Section 404(b) expressly designates the Secretary’s authority in Sec-
tion(a) subject to 404(c).40 Section 404(c) authorizes the Administrator “to 
prohibit the specification (including the withdrawal of specification) of any 
defined area as a disposal site” and to “deny or restrict the use of any de-
fined area for specification (including the withdrawal of specification) as a 
disposal site, whenever he determines . . . that the discharge of such materi-
als into such area will have an unacceptable adverse effect” on identified 
environmental resources.41 Before making such a determination, the Admin-
istrator must consult with the Secretary and publicly state his findings and 
reasons for the determination.42 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. was a 
landmark United States Supreme Court decision that set forth the standard 
by which a court must evaluate an agency’s interpretation of its own stat-
ute.43 Chevron involved an interpretation of the Clean Air Act Amendments 
of 1977 (the “amendments”), which imposed certain requirements on states 
that had not achieved national air quality standards established by EPA 
(“nonattainment states”).44 Under the amendments, nonattainment states 
had to obtain a permit for any new or modified major stationary source of 
pollution.45 In 1980, EPA adopted a rule that required a new permit for a 
stationary source if any one part of the stationary source was replaced or 
modified.46 In 1981, however, EPA adopted an alternative rule that exempt-
ed a stationary source if that source, in the aggregate, was not increasing its 
emission of pollution.47 The question for the Court was whether EPA’s in-
                                                                                                                           
 37 33 U.S.C. § 1311(a); Mingo Logan II, 714 F.3d 608, 610 (D.C. Cir. 2013). 
 38 33 U.S.C. § 1344(a); Mingo Logan II, 714 F.3d at 610. 
 39 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b); Mingo Logan II, 714 F.3d at 610. 
 40 33 U.S.C. § 1344(b); Mingo Logan II, 714 F.3d at 610. 
 41 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c). 
 42 Id. 
 43 467 U.S. 837 (1984); see Chevron, U.S.A. v. Natural Res. Def. Council, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE [hereinafter Chevron, U.S.A.], http://www.justice.gov/enrd/chevron-usa-v-natural-res-
def-council [http://perma.cc/8ZB5-TRWY]. 
 44 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 839–40; see Clean Air Act Amendments of 1977, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 7491(a)(1) (2012). 
 45 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 839–40. 
 46 Id. at 857. 
 47 See id. at 857–58. 
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terpretation of the amendments was a permissible construction of the statu-
tory language.48 The Supreme Court, applying a two-part test, ruled in favor 
of EPA.49 
The Chevron two-part test has become the benchmark standard for de-
termining whether an agency’s interpretation of its enabling statute is per-
missible.50 First, the court must determine whether “Congress has directly 
spoken to the precise question at issue.”51 “If the intent of Congress is clear, 
that is the end of the matter.”52 If the statute is “silent or ambiguous” with 
respect to the specific issue, however, the court must then consider whether 
the agency’s interpretation is reasonable.53 
In almost every major case since the Chevron decision, courts have af-
firmed agencies’ interpretations of their organic statutes if the court reaches 
the second step.54 Therefore, whether the language of the statute is clear or 
not will almost certainly determine the case.55 Courts differ as to how to 
determine whether Congress’s intent was in fact clear.56 Courts may deter-
mine the intent of Congress by analyzing “the statute’s text, structure, pur-
pose, and legislative history.”57 Courts may also only look at the plain statu-
tory text.58 
The results of many legal questions ultimately depend on how judges 
apply the various tools of statutory interpretation, for which there are 
many.59 The Supreme Court has not provided lower courts with a clear path 
                                                                                                                           
 48 Id. at 859. 
 49 Id. at 842–43, 866. 
 50 Chevron, U.S.A., supra note 43; see Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842–43. 
 51 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 842. 
 52 Id. 
 53 See id. at 843. 
 54 See Marianne Kunz Shanor, Note, Administrative Law—The Supreme Court’s Impingement 
of Chevron’s Two-Step; Energy Corp. v. Riverkeeper, Inc., 129 S.Ct. 1498 (2009), 10 WYO. L. 
REV. 537, 552–53 (2010) (“[T]he Supreme Court only twice invalidated an agency’s construction 
of a statute relying solely on step two of the [Chevron] doctrine.”). But see Whitman v. Am. 
Trucking Ass’ns, 531 U.S. 457, 484–85 (2001) (finding EPA’s interpretation of an ambiguous 
statute unreasonable because EPA’s interpretation would have rendered a subpart of the statute 
nugatory). 
 55 Shanor, supra note 54, at 553. 
 56 Compare Food & Drug Admin. v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 161 
(2000) (considering tobacco legislation as a whole to determine whether or not Congress directly 
spoke to the issue of whether or not FDA had authority to regulate tobacco under the Food and 
Drug Administration Act), with Pauley v. BethEnergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 706 (1991) 
(Scalia, J., dissenting) (finding regulatory language complex but not ambiguous), and Dole v. 
United Steelworkers of Am., 494 U.S. 26, 43 (1990) (White, J., dissenting) (finding fault with the 
majority opinion’s conclusion that the Paperwork Reduction Act was clear and unambiguous be-
cause its reasoning required more than ten pages to explain why it was clear and unambiguous). 
 57 Mingo Logan I, 850 F. Supp. 2d 133, 140 (D.D.C. 2012). 
 58 See Zuni Pub. Sch. Dist. No. 89 v. Dep’t of Educ., 550 U.S. 81, 108 (2007). 
 59 Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the Rules or Canons 
About How Statutes Are to Be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395, 396–406 (1950). 
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for applying these tools.60 For example, United Savings Ass’n of Texas v. 
Timbers of Inwood Forest Associates held that “a provision that may seem 
ambiguous in isolation is often clarified by the remainder of the statutory 
scheme . . . .”61 Burlington Northern & Santa Fe Railway Co. v. White held 
that “where words differ . . . ‘Congress acts intentionally and purposely in 
the disparate inclusion or exclusion’” of those words.62 Corley v. United 
States applied “one of the most basic interpretative canons, that a statute 
should be construed so that effect is given to all its provisions, so that no 
part will be inoperative or superfluous, void or insignificant.”63 The result 
of a case, therefore, depends in large part on which canons of statutory in-
terpretation a court applies, but which canons to apply remains unclear.64 
III. ANALYSIS 
In Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit held that the U.S. 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) did not lack statutory authority 
under the Clean Water Act (CWA) to withdraw a proposal site specification 
post-permit.65 The court came to this conclusion by looking at the scheme 
of the permitting process and the express language of Section 404(c) of the 
CWA.66 The court’s decision has far-reaching implications for the expand-
ing authority of EPA, but such expansion is justified given the text of the 
law and the need for the federal government to take immediate action dur-
ing environmental crises.67 
The D.C. Circuit found that the language of the CWA unambiguously 
expressed Congress’s intent, thus ending the two-step inquiry articulated in 
Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. at step 
                                                                                                                           
 60 Compare Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v. White, 548 U.S. 53, 63 (2006) (presuming 
that where Congress uses different words, it does so intentionally), and United Sav. Ass’n of Tex. 
v. Timbers of Inwood Forest Assocs., Ltd., 484 U.S. 365, 371 (1988) (looking to the entire statuto-
ry scheme to interpret the meaning of a term or phrase), with Corley v. United States, 556 U.S. 
303, 304 (2009) (treating every word of a statute as though Congress included it intentionally). 
 61 United Sav. Ass’n of Tex., 484 U.S. at 371. 
 62 548 U.S. at 63. 
 63 Mingo Logan II, 714 F.3d 608, 614 (D.C. Cir. 2013) (quoting Corley, 556 U.S. at 314 (in-
ternal brackets and quotation marks omitted)). 
 64 See generally id. at 612–16; Mingo Logan I, 850 F. Supp. 2d 133, 138–53 (D.D.C. 2012); 
Llewellyn, supra note 59, at 396–406. 
 65 Mingo Logan II, 714 F.3d at 616; see 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c) (2012). 
 66 Mingo Logan II, 714 F.3d at 612–14; see 33 U.S.C. § 1344(c). 
 67 See infra notes 92–106 and accompanying text (noting that while EPA’s authority to essen-
tially revoke permits might have negative implications such as a chilling effect in industry, the 
need for EPA’s expertise to protect our environment outweighs those negative implications, and 
Congress gave EPA that authority). 
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one. 68 This conclusion was based on the following logic: Section 404 of the 
CWA authorizes the United States Corps of Engineers (the “Corps”)—not 
EPA—to issue permits to discharge dredged or fill material.69 Despite this 
authority of the Corps, Congress granted EPA “a broad environmental 
‘backstop’ authority” over site selection.70 Section 404 prescribes no time 
limit for the Secretary of EPA to withdraw the permit, but rather “expressly 
empowers him to prohibit, restrict, or withdraw the specification ‘whenever’ 
he makes a determination that the statutory ‘unacceptable adverse effect’ 
will result.”71 Citing the Oxford English Dictionary, the court interpreted 
“whenever” to mean “at any time.”72 “Thus, the unambiguous language of 
Section 404(c) manifests the Congress’s intent to confer on EPA a broad 
veto power extending beyond the permit issuance.”73 The court further un-
derscored Congress’s intent by noting that “withdrawal” is “a term of retro-
spective application.”74 Therefore, EPA withdrawal can “only be exercised 
post-permit,” and it would not make sense for them to exercise their with-
drawal authority at any other time.75 Using this reasoning, the court deter-
mined that Congress had directly spoken to the precise question at issue, 
and therefore, it did not proceed to the second step of the Chevron test.76 
The district court, however, found that the text of 404(c) was at best 
ambiguous.77 The district court stated that EPA’s purported specification 
withdrawal authority “does not make a great deal of sense since under the 
statute, EPA doesn’t ‘specify’ in the first place—it is only empowered to 
prohibit or decline to prohibit the Corps from doing so.”78 Therefore, “it is 
not clear how . . . EPA could ‘withdraw’ a decision it has not made.”79 
While the district court found there was some language in section 404(c) 
that could be considered ambiguous (thus rendering necessary Chevron 
analysis at step two), it also found that neither the statue as a whole, nor the 
legislative history, supported EPA’s argument that it could withdraw its 
specification.80 
                                                                                                                           
 68 Mingo Logan II, 714 F.3d at 612. 
 69 Id.; see 33 U.S.C § 1344. 
 70 Mingo Logan II, 714 F.3d at 612; see 33 U.S.C § 1344(c). 
 71 33 U.S.C § 1344(c); Mingo Logan II, 714 F.3d at 613. 
 72 Mingo Logan II, 714 F.3d at 613 (describing the English Oxford Dictionary’s definition of 
“whenever”). 
 73 Id. 
 74 Id. 
 75 See id. 
 76 See id. at 612. 
 77 Mingo Logan I, 850 F. Supp. 2d 133, 134 (D.D.C. 2012). 
 78 Id. at 140. 
 79 Id. 
 80 Id. at 142–46. 
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The district court’s primary problem with EPA’s interpretation of its 
withdrawal authority was that EPA confused its role with the Corps’ role in 
the permitting process.81 EPA and the Corps are purported to have separate 
and distinct roles, but EPA conflates its role with the Corps’ by treating 
EPA’s specification authority the same as the Corps’ permitting authority.82 
EPA’s specification of the disposal site is based on its expertise concerning 
environmental impact, and the Corps’ permitting authority is based on its 
engineering expertise.83 By treating its specification authority like the 
Corps’ permitting authority, EPA acted outside of its statutory confines.84 
At step two of the Chevron test, the district court found that EPA’s in-
terpretation was unreasonable.85 First, it found EPA’s interpretation “illogi-
cal and impractical” because EPA simultaneously claimed that (1) it did not 
revoke a permit (it only withdrew a specification), and (2) the withdrawal of 
the specification effectively revoked the permit.86 Second, the district court 
found that EPA’s interpretation was unreasonable because it would create 
uncertainty for a system “expressly intended to provide finality.”87 The dis-
trict court reasoned that industry would be less willing to lend and invest if 
permits could be revoked retroactively.88 This analysis is understandable; an 
individual could incur substantial costs relying on an issued permit, only to 
see that permit withdrawn a year later.89 
The circuit court dismissed the district court’s conclusions, relying 
heavily on the text of Section 404 and finding no inconsistencies between 
Section 404 and the permitting scheme.90 In fact, the circuit court scarcely 
mentioned the policy implications addressed by Mingo Logan and the dis-
trict court.91 
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Although there are negative implications associated with EPA’s pseu-
do-permit revocation authority, it is not the court’s role to solve them.92 It is 
a “familiar canon of statutory construction that the starting point for inter-
preting a statute is the language of the statute itself.”93 Further, “[a]bsent a 
clearly expressed legislative intention to the contrary, that language must 
ordinarily be regarded as conclusive.”94 It is not the court’s responsibility to 
determine how agencies operate; rather, it is for Congress to decide.95 
If the courts were to involve themselves in the legislative process and 
strip EPA of its pseudo-permit revocation authority, it would be bad poli-
cy.96 The safeguard contained within the 404(c) provision is necessary for 
the welfare of the public and the environment.97 For example, in 1981, EPA 
was able to use its 404(c) veto authority to restrict part of a permit authoriz-
ing the placement of fill into 291 acres in North Miami for the development 
of a public recreation facility.98 EPA exercised its veto power only after 
learning that North Miami modified its Corps’ permit to allow it to use solid 
waste and garbage as the fill material.99 EPA determined that such fill mate-
rial would have unacceptable adverse effects on wildlife and the environ-
ment based on observed increased ammonia levels.100 Without the authority 
for EPA to revisit its specification site permit, EPA could not have prevented 
such adverse effects.101 
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Although the district court was correct in distinguishing the separate 
roles of EPA and the Corps, it failed to resolve the resulting problem: the 
Corps would be responsible for decision-making only suitable for EPA’s 
expertise.102 It is illogical to relinquish EPA’s regulatory powers simply be-
cause it had already specified disposal sites.103 If new information arises 
that makes a site unsuitable, EPA should have the authority to make the de-
cision to withdraw a permit, not the Corps, which has no expertise in envi-
ronmental protection.104 Congress unambiguously granted EPA that authori-
ty, and there was reason for it.105 The argument that uncertainty will chill 
industry has merit, but the alternative of leaving industry unregulated is 
much more risky.106 
CONCLUSION 
In Mingo Logan Coal Co. v. U.S. Environmental Protection Agency, the 
U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit upheld the U.S. 
Environmental Protect Agency’s (EPA) interpretation of its authority under 
Section 404 of the Clean Water Act, which permits it to withdraw the specifi-
cation of any defined area as a disposal site retroactively whenever it deter-
mines that the discharge will have an “unacceptable adverse effect” on identi-
fied environmental resources. This decision essentially gives EPA the authori-
ty to revoke discharge permits at any time, no matter the circumstances of the 
permitting process. Despite the unintended consequences of this interpreta-
tion—including confusing the roles of various agencies and cooling industry 
from lending and investing due to uncertainty—congressional intent should 
not be replaced by a court’s judgment. There are strong policy reasons for 
giving EPA the authority to take quick action when new information is avail-
able, and unless Congress changes the language in Section 404, courts should 
not interfere. 
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